ABSTRACT: This paper investigates the strategic use of judicial institutions. Independent courts raise the cost to future regimes of altering policies passed today, but may also make today's policymaking more difficult. Politicians therefore face a tradeoff. To analyze that tradeoff, this paper develops a model of strategic institutional choice. The model predicts that the greater the probability of losing power and the greater the distance between the policy ideals of rival parties, the more likely is an independent judiciary to be established. Empirical evidence supports the model's predictions. An analysis of the judicial retention procedures of the American states shows that the most independence-enhancing institutions are generally associated with higher levels of political competition and greater differences between party platforms, while the reverse is true of the least independence-enhancing institutions.
See, e.g., Glazer (1989) , Persson and Svensson (1989) , Aghion and Bolton (1990) , Alesina and 1 , Tabellini and Alesina (1990) , Milesi-Ferretti (1995) , Besley and Coate (1998) . Landes and Posner (1975, 875) define an independent judiciary as "one that does not make 2 decisions on the basis of the sorts of political factors (for example, the electoral strength of the people affected by a decision) that would influence and in most cases control the decision were it to be made by a legislative body."
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I. INTRODUCTION
A number of studies demonstrate that a lack of permanence in office can inspire policymakers to act strategically. For example, when a future coalition is likely to have policy 1 preferences different from those of the current regime, the current officeholders may have the incentive to raise the cost of future policy changes. This in turn may lead to deviations from the policies that would have been chosen if the regime did not face replacement. It has been suggested, among other things, that budget deficits might be larger (Persson and Svensson 1989 or capital projects more durable (Glazer 1989) than would otherwise be the case. This paper investigates whether a similar strategic dynamic can explain variations in judicial independence. Scholars have long recognized that independent judiciaries raise the cost 2 of altering established policies (indeed, this is one of the main justifications for an independent court). Judges who can not be penalized by actors in the other branches of government are able to insist on the strict application of constitutional and statutory procedures, require legislation to be rewritten rather than merely reinterpreted, impose constitutional and procedural requirements on policy changes, and so forth. By contrast, judges who can be penalized-deprived of office, for example-are more likely to deliver the decisions that the most recent electoral victors prefer.
However, at the same time, independence-enhancing institutions may encourage judges to engage Hence, for example, concern about "activist" judges in the very independent U.S. federal courts. 3 The theoretical study that generates predictions most similar to these is Alesina and Tabellini's 4 (1990) analysis of the political economy of budget deficits. Budget deficits (like independent courts) limit the policy options of successors in power, but at the cost of one's own ability to influence policy. Alesina and Tabellini predict that, to the degree deficit spending is used strategically, deficits will be larger where an incumbent party is less likely to be reelected, and where political parties are more polarized. This paper's very different model makes the same predictions for an independent court. 2 in policymaking of their own. In short, from the perspective of policymakers in the legislative 3 or executive branches, there is a tradeoff: future policy durability versus current policy control.
To provide a theoretical framework for analyzing this tradeoff, I develop a simple twoperiod model. At the start of the game, an incumbent political party chooses between two judicial institutions, one that allows the judge to serve for both periods (creating an "independent" judiciary), and one that allows the judge to be replaced at the end of the first period if the current officeholder desires (creating a "dependent" judiciary). The incumbent party faces an exogenously-determined probability of losing power to a rival at the end of the first period. The judge makes a policy choice each period, but at the time of appointment, the appointing party can not observe the judge's policy preferences with certainty. The model predicts that, ceteris paribus, the greater the probability of losing power and the greater the distance between the policy ideals of the rival parties, the more likely is the incumbent to establish an independent judiciary. 4 To test these predictions, state-level data on U.S. judicial institutions are employed. Five different procedures to retain state judges were (and are) in use, and a number of states altered their procedures during the period covered by this study. Consistent with the model's predictions, the most independence-enhancing institutions-those that reduce to the greatest An exception is Ramseyer (1994) , who, although he does not model it formally, uses a similar 5 tradeoff to that analyzed here to explain why Japanese courts are less independent than American federal courts (he suggests testing his hypothesis on the American state courts, as this paper does). See also Ginsburg (2001) , who finds some evidence that greater judicial independence is associated with closer competition between political parties in ex-Soviet bloc countries.
See, e.g., Levy and Spiller (1994) . 6 3 degree the ability of incumbent officials, political parties, and other electorally important actors to influence whether a judge serves subsequent terms-are found to be significantly (statistically and economically) associated with closer competition between political parties and greater differences in party platforms, while the least independence-enhancing institutions are associated with stronger single party control. The strength of the estimated associations varies somewhat with the measures used; nonetheless, the overall pattern appears to correspond reasonably closely to the model's predictions.
Although the idea that policy objectives may be affected by strategic goals is well established theoretically (see the studies cited above), empirical tests demonstrating the nature of the strategic behavior are few. A major contribution of this analysis is to provide evidence that observed institutional choices appear to reflect such forward-looking concerns. The paper also contributes by formalizing and testing a theory that derives judicial institutions from maximizing behavior. There is as yet no adequate accounting for the significant variations in levels of judicial independence seen both within this country and around the world. The growing 5 consensus that independent courts are an important input to economic development renders these variations even more puzzling. This paper provides an explanation why, whatever its social 6 benefits, an independent judiciary is not always in the interest of those who write the rules.
II. THE MODEL
Maskin and Tirole model an electorate that chooses from the following three institutions: direct 7 democracy, representative democracy, and nonaccountability (i.e., independence). Their primary focus is the effect of the institution on social welfare. By contrast, I focus on how the incentives of the institution's designers (whom I assume are political parties) are affected by the prospect of replacement in power.
The model could alternatively be represented as current voters choosing a judicial institution in 8 awareness of the fact that future voters (who may be the same people) may have different policy preferences. However, the empirical test that follows is geared towards competing political parties.
One might think of a newly passed law which, in the process of judicial review, the judge has 9 the opportunity to nullify or reinterpret, or of a new administration attempting to informally redefine an existing law, and wishing that redefinition to stand up in court. Of course, for judicial review to occur, a suit must be brought, and the likelihood of that happening will itself be affected by the nature of the institution in place-there is no point in challenging a law the current regime supports if the court is sure to decide in the regime's favor. Thus, one can interpret the dependent court in the model as either deciding as the incumbent desires, or as deterring challenges to the incumbent's actions in the first place. In either case, the incumbent ends up with the policy it wants.
That there is error in the process of selecting judges is clear. For example, Segal and Spaeth 10 (1993) discuss how American presidents have consistently attempted to shape the character of the U.S.
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The following model takes its approach from Maskin and Tirole (2001) . The game 7 begins with a political party, A, in power. Party A directs a constitution design stage at t = 0 in 8 which a binding (for the rest of the game) judicial institution is chosen. There are two subsequent periods, t = 1, 2. Party A appoints a judge at the start of period 1. The judge then takes an action from feasible set {a, b}. At the end of period 1, an election is held, which 9 incumbent A wins with probability x and rival B wins with probability (1-x). The judge then chooses the action for period 2 from the same set, and the game ends.
Political party A prefers a to b, while rival B prefers b to a. The judge's preferences over actions cannot be observed precisely at the time the judge is appointed; however, the appointing party knows that the judge shares its preference ranking with probability B, and has the opposite ranking with probability (1-B). Parameter B thus measures the ability of the appointer to screen judicial candidates. Because a party can always flip an unbiased coin if nothing works better, B Supreme Court by choosing justices with similar ideological predispositions to their own, and have just as consistently been thwarted. This is in the spirit of models such as in Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) , who look at 11 elections as disciplining devices. 5 is bounded from below by 0.5.
Two judicial institutions are available at the start of the game. Institution D (for "dependent" judiciary) allows the winner of the election to replace the judge at the end of period 1 with a new judge. Institution I (for "independent" judiciary) instead guarantees the judge a two-period term. Under institution I, the judge will choose her preferred policy in each period.
By contrast, the effect of institution D depends on whether the judge values more choosing her preferred policy in period 1 or remaining in office through period 2-at the end of period 1, the appointing party will replace a judge who decides against it. Let P be the utility the judge 11 receives from choosing the policy she prefers in the first period, and O be the utility she receives from remaining in office for the second period regardless of first period policy. If O > P, the dependent judge will choose a in period 1 with probability 1, while if P > O, the judge will choose a in period 1 with probability B, and b with probability 1-B. Whether O > P or P > O is common knowledge. Because the game ends with period 2, both judge types choose their preferred policy in the second period.
To begin with, assume that party A receives a benefit equal to 1 for each period policy a is chosen and 0 for each period policy b is chosen. A's expected payoff from institution I is In other words, the higher the probability of reelection, the greater the screening ability necessary to make the payoff to institution I higher than to institution D.
To examine the effect of the extent of party policy differences on the choice of institution, I assume that there is a third action, c, a > c > b, which will be chosen by a judge who wishes to deviate from either a or b. The screening ability variable B now measures the probability that the appointed judge will choose a (or b) rather than c. In other words, as the distance between policies a and b increases, ceteris paribus, an ever lower screening ability makes the payoff from institution I higher than from D .
With screening ability held constant, propositions 1 and 2 can be restated as testable predictions:
1) A stronger hold on power by the incumbent party (a higher value of x) will lead to less independent courts, ceteris paribus. 
2)
A larger difference in party platforms (a higher value of ª ) will lead to more independent courts, ceteris paribus.
III. THE DATA
A. Measuring Judicial Independence
The analysis to follow will be based on the procedures used in a state's appellate courts, which 12 is what table 1 presents. In most cases, the same procedures are used in lower courts as well. See Hanssen (2003) for a more detailed discussion of these procedures and their initial development.
The issue in question is the independence of sitting judges, which may be entirely unrelated to 13 the politicization (or not) of the initial selection process. For example, sitting justices on the U.S. Supreme Court are nearly impervious to political pressure, yet the initial appointment of these justices often involves politically-charged and acrimonious debate. For a discussion of term length in the state courts, see section IV.C below. procedures-see Figure 1 . Thus, there is time-series as well as cross-sectional variation to exploit.
The model focuses attention most directly on retention procedures; the ease with which a judge can be replaced when the judge's term expires. The more easily a judge can be replaced, Lacking an alternative candidate, voters almost never replace incumbents; see, e.g., Hall and 15 Aspin (1987) and Jenkins (1977) . See also Webster (1995, 33) for citations to studies concluding that merit plan judges are less likely to face replacement than are other judges. incorporated into state law in 47 states) forbids a judge from campaigning unless opposed-see Alfini and Brooks (1989) .
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in the press, on the grounds that they allow "undue" political pressure to be brought to bear on state judges. For example, the American Bar Association baldly states that, "The curse of the elective system is that it turns every elective judge into a politician." Researchers have 14 provided evidence that partisan-elected judges decide cases in a more clearly partisan fashion than do other state judges (Nagel 1973) , dissent less frequently with respect to politically controversial issues (Hall and Brace 1996) , side less frequently with challengers to a regulatory status quo (Hanssen 1999) , and inspire less preemption from incumbent officials in the other branches (Hanssen 2000 ).
An equally strong consensus holds that the most independent state judges are those subject to the merit plan. As opposed to having sitting judges run in competitive elections, or requiring re-appointment by officials in the other branches of government, the merit plan mandates unopposed "retention" elections; ballots read simply "Should Judge X be retained in 10 in law reviews extol the plan's independence-increasing virtues. For example, Webster (1995, 17 30) writes, "The principal argument made by proponents of 'merit' selection . . . is that it removes politics from the process."
Thus, there is a broad consensus: Partisan-elected state judges are the most easily subjected to political pressure-i.e., the least independent-while merit plan state judges are the most insulated from the political process-i.e., the most independent. These two procedures 18 will therefore be my principal measures of judicial independence. The other three procedures-nonpartisan elections, gubernatorial appointment, and legislative appointment-fall somewhere in between partisan elections and the merit plan in their independence-inducing effects. Because they are less easily ranked (there being no corresponding consensus in the literature), I will group them together for testing purposes.
B. Measuring Political Competition
In order See such review articles as Tucker (1982) , King (1988) , and Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) .
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The index is calculated by summing the average percentage of seats held by Democrats in the 21 upper and lower houses, the Democratic proportion of the gubernatorial vote, and whether the Democrats controlled both branches of state government. That total is divided by 4, producing a variable (the "unfolded" Ranney index) that varies from zero (total Republican control) to 1.0 (total Democratic control). The index used here (sometimes called the "folded" Ranney index) is calculated as: 1 -|unfolded index -0.5|. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) policy distance variable equal to 0 and will include a dummy variable equal to 1.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The model makes two predictions: 1) a stronger hold on power by the incumbent party will lead to less independent courts, ceteris paribus, and 2) larger differences in party platforms will lead to more independent courts, ceteris paribus. I will begin by testing these hypotheses on the distribution of retention procedures in the American states, and then turn to the changes in procedures that occurred during the sample period. If the first prediction is correct, I should find the use of partisan judicial elections associated with larger legislative majorities, with more frequent single party control, with less frequent changes in party control, and with lower values of the Ranney index. I should find the reverse for the merit plan. If prediction 2 is correct, I
should find a negative association between partisan judicial elections and the distance between party platforms, and again the reverse for the merit plan.
A. Retention Procedures
I start with a simple comparison of means, shown on the top of table 3. The use of partisan judicial elections is associated with legislative majorities that are nearly one-third larger on average than those of merit plan states, and nearly one-quarter larger than those of states using one of the other procedures. In 95 percent of partisan election states, the same party controlled both houses of the legislature, versus in 83 percent of merit plan and 82 percent of other states. Table 4 reports coefficient estimates and marginal effects for two alternative specifications, the first including the three separate measures of interparty competition in state legislatures, and the second including only the Ranney index (which combines the three with
Because of the structure of the multinomial logit model, one can not discern directly from the 27 coefficient estimates the predicted effects of changes in the regressors on changes in the outcome probabilities.
The chi-squared statistic is 75.44 for legislative majority, 76.35 for the Ranney index, and 28 23.86 and 17.96 for policy distance, all significant at well under one-tenth of one percent. The chisquared statistic for single party control is 12.07, significant at less than one percent, and for changes in party control is 5.02, significant at the 8 percent level.
The marginal effects are computed setting the regressors to their mean values. In part, this was simply the result of reducing the sample from 1004 to 468 observations.
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I used STATA's "cluster" (robust error) command.
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The exceptions are the coefficient on majority percentage for the merit plan (the marginal effect 34 is still statistically significant), and the coefficient on changes in party control (again, the marginal effect is still statistically significant) and the marginal effect on policy distance, both for partisan elections.
17 similar results, although many of the coefficients were not statistically significant individually. Hanssen 2003) . Movements from partisan to nonpartisan elections may also have been intended to increase judicial independence, and I found some evidence, albeit statistically weaker, that the same political variables that predict changes to the merit plan also predict these changes.
B. Changes in Procedure
The American Judicature Society (AJS) has actively promoted the merit plan nationwide, 37 holding conferences and/or providing support in other forms to groups around the country-see the AJS website. See also Champagne and Haydel (1993) , Dubois (1990) , and Berkson and Carbon (1978) , who between them describe efforts to implement the merit plan in 30 different states. All three conclude that success has depended crucially on the level of support, or opposition, from elected officials in the other branches.
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partisan judicial elections and six from nonpartisan judicial elections. An additional six states 35 switched from partisan judicial elections to nonpartisan judicial elections, one state switched from nonpartisan judicial elections to partisan judicial elections, and one partisan electing state and two legislative appointing states switched to gubernatorial appointment.
In this section, I will investigate whether the same political variables that appear to explain the distribution of retention procedures can also explain changes in procedure. I will focus primarily on changes to the merit plan, both because they were the most frequent, and because the effect on judicial independence of a change to the merit plan is clearer than is that of a change to one of the other procedures. Furthermore, campaigns to implement the merit plan I can examine these relationships more precisely by estimating a fixed effects logit model See Chamberlain (1980) for the derivation of the fixed effects logit model.
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States that do not change their retention procedures (to or from the merit plan) during the Table 6 shows the results (the demographic controls are excluded, because they vary insufficiently over time to allow the model to converge). Consistent with the model's predictions, the coefficient on majority percentage is negative and statistically significant at less than one percent, while the coefficient on the Ranney index is positive and statistically significant at less than one percent. The coefficient estimates on the other political variables are statistically insignificant, which is not entirely surprising given the inclusion of state effects.
However, when a fixed effects linear probability model is estimated instead (results not shown), the coefficients on the policy distance variable and on the changes in party control variable are both statistically significant, as well. Because the merit plan gives relatively more influence to the governor in terms of the initial 43 selection process, politicians in states where (levels of political competition otherwise held equal) the legislative and executive branches are controlled by the same party might be expected to support the merit plan more enthusiastically. Indeed, in 64 percent of the cases in the data set where judicial elections were replaced by the merit plan (9 of 14 instances), the governor and the legislature were controlled by the same party, versus a little over 50 percent of the time in other states.
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to the probability of the state switching to the merit plan. As noted, merit plan campaigns have Over the decade preceding the adoption of the merit plan, the size of the legislative majority fell by 7 percentage points in adopting states versus by 2 percentage points in non-adopting states, a difference statistically significant at less than 5 percent. The Ranney index increased by 6 points in adopting states versus by 2 points in non-adopting states, a difference statistically significant at I also estimated a Cox proportional hazards model on the time to implementation of the merit 44 plan by state, in years from 1950. The size of the majority percentage at the beginning of the period, and the increase in that percentage between then and the end of the period, are both associated with increases in survival time (i.e., more years before the merit plan is implemented), while the reverse is true of the Ranney index, as the model would predict. However, the standard errors of the coefficients were large, not surprisingly, given that all but 14 of the 44 observations are censored (i.e., no changes occurred).
Clearly, for judicial retention procedures to be a valid test of the model's predictions, they must 45 have a (somewhat, at least) binding effect on future regimes. And judicial selection and retention procedures are costly to change, being written into state constitutions, which must be formally amended (see, e.g., Berkson and Carbon 1978 , Champagne and Haydel 1993 , and Dubois 1990 for descriptions of both successful and failed attempts to institute the merit plan). On the other hand, it is certainly not necessary that the retention procedures be impossible to change. For example, it is far from clear that budget deficits, one of the more common applications of the strategic policy choice thesis, are strictly binding given the propensity of debtor nations to run high rates of inflation.
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less than 10 percent. And the distance between rival party platforms increased by six times more in adopting than in non-adopting states, although that difference is not statistically significant.
The logit results are shown in table 7. The coefficients on the change in majority percentage and change in Ranney index variables are of the predicted signs and statistically significant at less than five percent. The marginal effects (not shown) imply that a decade-to-decade rise of 0.1 in the majority percentage will be associated with 7 percent decrease in the likelihood of adopting the merit plan, while a 0.1 rise in the value of the Ranney index will be associated with a 6 percent increase in that likelihood. The coefficients on the policy distance variable are also of the predicted signs, although not statistically significant.
In sum, all three tests give evidence of a positive association between increases in political competition and switches to the merit plan, as the model would predict. 
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C. Term Length
Although, the analysis thus far has focused on retention procedures, the model's predictions presumably should also apply the length of the term that a judge serves. Ceteris paribus, the longer the judicial term, the fewer the re-selection opportunities available to politicians, and thus the greater the independence of the judge. several state bar associations confirm that term length has just not been on the radar screen as far as court reform is concerned. For example, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1982) presents a model court reform that makes the merit plan a central objective-along with five other procedural changes intended to increase the independence of state judges (an independent judicial compensation commission, for example)-but nowhere mentions the length of the judicial term. See also Berkson and Carbon (1978) , who recount in exhaustive detail eleven campaigns to reform state court structure, and provide much interesting evidence on the nature of attempts to implement the merit plan, but do not once mention efforts to alter term length.
When pressed for a reason, bar association representatives responded, first, that merit selection 49 makes judges sufficiently independent that changes to term length are not necessary, and, second, that proposals to increase judicial terms tend to be more controversial-term length more obviously affects the "accountability" of state judges to the general electorate, and judicial accountability is an issue of public concern (see, e.g., the September 1988 symposium in the Southern California Law Review on judicial selection and accountability in the state courts). 
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has investigated the strategic choice of judicial institutions. By establishing an independent court, politicians currently in office can make it more difficult for successors to alter the policies passed today. At the same time, however, an independent court can itself exert greater influence over policy. The paper develops a simple model of politicians facing that tradeoff. The model predicts that the lower the probability of retaining office and the greater the distance between the policy ideals of competing parties, the more likely is an independent court to be established. Evidence from the American states supports the model's predictions. The most independence-enhancing judicial institutions are found where higher levels of political competition and larger differences between party platforms exist, while the least independenceenhancing institutions are found where there is stronger control by a single party.
There is an interesting difference between this and the studies of strategic policy choice cited at the start of this paper. While previous work emphasizes departures from efficiency likely to be induced by the prospect of losing political control (e.g., budget deficits that are too large, capital projects that are too durable), in this instance strategic objectives lead to the outcome most widely viewed as socially desirable, an independent court. The reason is that although society may collectively benefit when an independent court enforces constitutional and statutory commitments, incumbent politicians sometimes find it in their interest to renege. This 50 productive activities, see, e.g., North and Weingast (1989) , Barzel (2000) , and Fleck and Hanssen (2002) .
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is an important and well-recognized problem: James Madison wrote, "In framing a government that is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself." (The Federalist, No. 51, 349) . The analysis presented here suggests that, as one might expect, such self-control is rendered more attractive by the prospect it will also be imposed on rivals with very different policy views. 1 ). For purposes of calculation, the value of 17 years was assigned to a life a term, because the average state supreme court justice ascends the bench at the age of 53 (see Glick and Emmert 1987) , and retirement at age 70 is usually required. The changes in majority size, Ranney index, and policy distance are calculated in two steps. First, the average value of the variable is calculated for each decade from the 1940s through the 1980s. Second, from the average for each decade t is subtracted the average from the previous decade; i.e., from decade t-1. The resulting measure is the change in the average value of that variable over that decade; i.e., during decade t. States are then coded as to whether or not they changed to the merit plan during that same decade; i.e., during decade t. The 189 observations consist of the following: 46 states for which data is available for all five decades; Alaska, Hawaii, which joined the Union in the late 1950s, so that only two observations could be calculated; and Minnesota, which maintained a nonpartisan legislature until 1974, so that only one observation could be calculated. (Again, Nebraska is not included.) Standard errors are in parentheses. *** = significant at less than one percent; ** = significant at less than five percent; * = significant at less than ten percent. The dependent variable equals length of judicial term, in years. The second and fourth columns show the coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares regressions corrected for first degree autocorrelation. The third and fifth columns show coefficients from Poisson regressions, with robust standard errors in parentheses. 
